Introduction
How much control can central banks exert over short-term market interest rates? Observing how far short-term market rates deviate from policy rates for different countries may give clues about the influence that authorities have over market rates. And since differences in how central banks conduct money market operations remain, such analysis may also offer insights into the effectiveness of various approaches that central banks employ to smooth interest rate volatility, such as requiring minimum reserves.
There is a large literature in which the time series properties of short-term market interest rates are estimated (see, for example, Brennan and Schwartz (1982) , Dietrich-Campbell and Schwartz (1986) , Sanders and Unal (1988) , Chan et al (1991) and Nowman (1997) ). And a smaller body of work considers the different operating systems central banks use to provide marginal liquidity to the banking system (see, for example, Borio (1997) ).
But with the exception of Hamilton (1996) in the United States, there has been little attention paid to the time series profile of divergences in short-term market rates from the policy rates used by the central bank to provide marginal liquidity. In this paper we use a simple reduced-form model to answer some simple questions about the volatility and persistence of divergences of short-term money market rates (overnight, one week and one month) from policy rates across three European countries which had quite different systems of money market operations before the introduction of the euro: Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. In particular, we consider four questions. Did short-term market rates revert to policy rates in the long run over the sample period? Did the speed with which they reverted to the long-run mean following a shock differ between countries? Did the volatility of short-term market rates differ between countries? And did it differ over time in response to changes in operating systems?
Our objective is to characterise the data rather than explicitly model the behaviour of the interbank market. But this is an important step in helping to evaluate the performance of operating systems. And analysis of these questions is especially pertinent now, given the recent large change in central bank operating systems in Europe associated with the introduction of the euro. We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. In the first section, we outline a simple model of short-term market rates. In Section 3, we briefly compare the operating systems used by central banks to steer short-term market rates in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom over the sample period. In Section 4, we describe the data we use. This helps to motivate the more detailed empirical work we conduct in Sections 5 and 6, in which we model the time series behaviour of short-term market rates using general method of moments techniques. In the final section we conclude.
A simple model
A number of studies in the empirical finance literature have estimated the parameters of a discrete time process in which the conditional mean and variance of the short-term interest rate depend on the level of the interest rate (see Brenner et al (1996) , Brennan and Schwartz (1982) , Dietrich-Campbell and Schwartz (1986) , Sanders and Unal (1988) and Chan et al (1991) ). Our model is based on that of Brenner et al (1996) . But unlike these earlier studies, our focus is the degree of control that central banks exercise over short-term money market rates: ie the divergence of the market rate from the policy rate (ie the interest rate on the main monetary instrument used by the central bank to provide marginal liquidity to the market). Its specification is: 
where t d is the divergence of the market rate from the policy rate and E(CΨ t-1 ) denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at time t-1. This process allows us considerable flexibility in estimating the persistence and volatility of the short-term interest rate process around the policy rate. The parameters of the model yield some simple insights into central banks' control over short-term market rates.
First, the long-run mean of the divergence between the market rate and the policy rate is given by the expression ). / ( β α −
(1) By testing whether this is significantly different from zero in each market, it is possible to infer the _____________________________________________________________ (1) The term 'long run' is used to describe the completion of the adjustment process described by equation (1), which may occur within days.
effectiveness of market operations in achieving a short-term market interest rate that coincides with the policy rate.
Second, the speed of reversion to this long-run mean is given by . β − Assuming a central bank does have control over long-run market rates, this measures the speed with which its operations drive rates back to their long-run values following shocks to the money market.
(2) Persistence in the divergence may be particularly important for propagating effects from shocks to short-term rates further up the term structure, since predictability in short-term rates will generate expectations of future divergences, and hence-via the expectations hypothesis-movements in longer rates.
Third, the volatility of short-term money market rates around the policy rate is given by F t . The underlying causes of volatility in short-term market rates may be unrelated to the system of money market operations. These may include market speculation over future changes in policy rates, the presence of errors by the central bank or its counterparties in forecasting the amount of funds the market needs to meet its reserve requirements, or non-competitive behaviour among participants in the market for central bank funds. But, as we discuss in more detail below, it is sometimes claimed that the level and autocorrelation of volatility is affected by the operating system adopted by the central bank. And it is certainly possible to test whether a change in a central bank's operating system affects short-term market interest rate volatility.
The model we use is fairly general, nesting two commonly used empirical models: the GARCH specification and the LEVELS specification. Both models include equations (1) and (2), but impose different restrictions on the conditional volatility (equation (3)). The GARCH specification parameterises conditional volatility as a function of unexpected shocks in the previous period to the interest rate and the conditional volatility in the previous period. That is:
_____________________________________________________________ (2) We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out that there may be occasions on which the central bank may not wish to drive market rates back to policy rates as soon as possible, and this may bias our estimate of $.
This captures the possibility of 'volatility clustering': high volatility is followed by high volatility, and low volatility by low volatility. The persistence in the variance is measured by . 1 b + α If this is large, but less than one, then following a large deviation in interest rates the shocks to rates will have a large variance for a considerable time thereafter. A value greater than one means that the variance is explosive, tending to infinity over time.
Assuming the variance is not explosive, we can calculate an unconditional variance. This is the expected variance as the forecast horizon becomes very large. In the limit, as time (s) tends to infinity, information at time (t) ( t Ψ ) ceases to provide useful information about the expected variance of 2 s t + ε . Instead, the expectation for this (unconditional) variance is given by:
This equation illustrates the connection between the persistence in variance and the unconditional volatility. Holding 0 α constant, an increase in the persistence of volatility increases the unconditional volatility. But because 0 α may vary across systems, it is not always the case that countries with operating systems that display greater persistence in volatility will also have a larger unconditional volatility.
In contrast to the GARCH specification, the LEVELS specification, analysed in Chan et al (1991) , parameterises volatility as a function of interest rate levels only.
Under this specification, volatility is large following periods when the divergence, rather than volatility, is high. Consequently, large shocks do not necessarily lead to a change in the conditional variance.
_____________________________________________________________
(3) More precisely, the volatility is modelled as a function of the difference between the interest rate and the policy rate.
How money market operating systems differ
How do central banks try to influence short-term market rates? Over recent years, the techniques used by central banks in advanced economies have tended to converge. But significant differences still exist between countries, reflecting both historical factors and different priorities and objectives between central banks (see Borio (1997) ). 
_____________________________________________________________ (4) Our brief review relies heavily upon Borio's (1997) excellent summary of the structure of money market operations across a range of countries. For the United Kingdom we also draw upon a number of other papers, principally Schnadt (1994) and Bank of England (1997) . (a) Since the introduction of gilt repo in March 1997, the average maturity is less than two weeks.
All three central banks provided the bulk of the liquidity they made available to the market ('refinancing') via open market operations at the policy rate. We highlight a number of key differences. A major distinction was that the United Kingdom had (almost) zero reserve requirements and a one-day maintenance period. Italy and Germany, by contrast, maintained positive reserve requirements. In Germany, the range of reserve ratios fell from 4.15%-12.1% of eligible liabilities in 1991 to 1.5%-2.0% in 1996. In Italy, reserve requirements were among the highest in Europe, at 15.0% in 1996.
(5) In both countries, the main objective for requiring reserves was to provide a buffer to stabilise the overnight rate. Consistent with this objective, the Bundesbank and Banca d'Italia required that reserve requirements be met, on average, over periods of one month.
(6) Hence banks were able to draw down reserve positions held at the central bank in the face of unforeseen liquidity shocks at any time during the maintenance period. In contrast, the Bank of England relied upon fine-tuning the liquidity of the sterling money market more regularly to stabilise short-term rates, holding up to three rounds of open market operations in a day. _____________________________________________________________ (5) These were reduced from a range of 22.5%-25.0% of eligible liabilities in 1990. (6) Positive reserve requirements are not necessary for such smoothing. As discussed in Davies (1998) , interest rate smoothing could be achieved with a buffer stock of reserves provided to banks through fully collateralised overdrafts from the central bank. In this case smoothing would be achieved through averaging around a zero reserve requirement. (7) This was reduced to two rounds a day in June 1998.
One claim that has been advanced (see, for example, the discussion in Borio (1997) ) is that the liquidity buffer provided by averaging reserves offers the central bank that uses them tighter control over short-term market rates than one that does not. To investigate this claim, we examine whether: (i) the long-run mean of the divergence between short-term market rates and the policy rate was lower in Germany and Italy than in the United Kingdom over the sample period; (ii) the speed of reversion to the long-run mean of the divergence was lower in the United Kingdom than in Germany or Italy and; (iii) the volatility of short-term market rates was lower in Germany and Italy than in the United Kingdom.
Another distinction concerns the maturity of the interest rates that the monetary authorities were keenest to influence (denoted the 'target' rate in Table A ). In Italy and Germany, the overnight interest rate wasexplicitly -the main focus or reference for policy. In contrast, the United Kingdom attached less importance to controlling the overnight rate for the implementation of monetary policy. The authorities set the two-week gilt repo rate and focused on influencing those interest rates at longer maturities that have a more direct effect on real economic activity (ie maturities in the one to three-month range).
(8) Hence it has been claimed (see, for example, Borio (1997) ) that overnight market rates in the United Kingdom were more volatile than in Germany and Italy, but relatively less volatile at slightly longer maturities (such as one week and one month).
Over the sample period there were two important changes to the structure of the money markets in the United Kingdom, which may have affected the Bank of England's ability to steer short-term market rates through its open market operations. First, the establishment of the gilt repo market in January 1996 removed a constraint on banks' ability to arbitrage in the interbank market, increased the financing options available to banks, and hence may have reduced the divergence between short-term market rates and the Bank's policy rate. We examine below whether the introduction of gilt repo did reduce the volatility of divergences in short-term market rates. Second, the introduction of two-week gilt repo as the main daily instrument for providing liquidity to the market in March 1997 increased the pool of collateral available to the banks for obtaining funds from the Bank of England, which may have reduced further the divergence between _____________________________________________________________ (8) See Bank of England (1997, page 205 ).
short-term market rates and the policy rate. We also examine whether this reform affected the volatility of divergences in short-term market rates.
Data description
For short-term market rates in the United Kingdom we use Libor. The value selected was the lowest offer quoted on the screens at 8:30am each morning for the three maturities we examined. Caveats apply: since the quotes were merely indicative, it is unclear how much trade was conducted at these rates; and time-of-day effects may mean that quotes at 8:30am were unrepresentative of rates throughout the day. Despite these reservations, Table B below shows that from January to August 1997, overnight Libor rates offered a reasonable approximation to the rates at which trades were actually transacted. Except for the overnight rates, we use eurocurrency rates taken from Datastream for German and Italian interest rates. These rates represent the average mid-price quoted by a sample of banks active in the appropriate money market. For the overnight rates, we use data provided by the BIS.
We use daily data for Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom detailing the market rates for overnight, one-week, one-month, three-month, six-month, and one-year maturities. Our dataset covers the period from January 1993 to April 1998 and contains more than 1,300 observations for each country at each maturity.
Charts 1-3 plot divergences in the overnight rate from the policy rate in the three countries for the part of our sample period since 1996. Sizable _____________________________________________________________ (9) Sterling overnight interbank average (SONIA) is the average overnight interest rate, weighted by trade volume, on unsecured overnight interbank lending arranged by seven London brokers. The series is not long enough for our purposes, only dating back to April 1997. Moreover, we do not have access to equivalent German or Italian series. (10) We are grateful to Claudio Borio and his staff for their assistance.
divergences occured in all countries.
(11) But it is also clear that the pattern of volatility was different across countries. Over the sample period the standard deviation of the divergence in the overnight rate from the policy rate (in basis points) was 27, 30 and 45 in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom respectively. In all three countries standard deviations were lower for the slightly longer maturities. They fell most rapidly in the United Kingdom. The standard deviation for the weekly (monthly) rates were, in the same order: 15 (14), 28 (24) and 30 (18). Systems that rely on averaging of reserve requirements over a maintenance period can generate regular and quite sharp spiking of very short-term rates around the end of the maintenance period. The regular spikes in the charts for Italy, and especially Germany, illustrate this point. However, in Germany large deviations were rare other than at the end of the maintenance period, whereas they were more frequent in the United Kingdom. On 35 occasions the German overnight rate deviated from the policy rate by 100 basis points, and in a further 42 instances it deviated by more than 50 basis points. In the United Kingdom the overnight rate deviated from the official rate by 100 basis points on 59 occasions, and by 100 points a further 198 times. The numbers were 17 and 59 respectively for Italy.
Another feature of the data illustrated by Charts 1-3 was the persistence of divergences in the overnight rate from the policy rate and the persistence of shocks to volatility itself. In Germany, however, the divergence of rates from the policy rate appeared to be both more regular and less persistent. This reflected the sharp but temporary effect on money market rates of the end of the monthly averaging period.
Results
In this section, we estimate the parameters for the model outlined in Section 2. We use a system of moment equations within the Generalised-Method-of-Moments (GMM) framework (12) developed by Hansen (1982) for the following reasons. First, we do not need to assume that the distribution of interest rate changes is normal: the asymptotic justification for the GMM procedure requires only that the joint distribution _____________________________________________________________ (11) Note that the difference between the overnight rate and the policy rate includes a term-structure element associated with market speculation over future policy changes. (12) This is the same technique used by Harvey (1988) , Longstaff (1989) , Chan et al (1991) , Gibbons and Ramaswamy (1993) , and Murphy (1994) . An alternative approach, maximum likelihood, is used by Brenner et al (1996) , who assume a t-distribution. of interest rate changes be stationary and ergodic, and that the relevant expectations exist. Second, the GMM estimators and their standard errors are consistent even if the disturbances are conditionally heteroskedastic and serially correlated. Although maximum likelihood (ML) is more efficient than GMM for values of 1 > γ , ML has the disadvantage that it maximises the likelihood of some observations too much relative to other observations (see Hull and White (1993) 
General and nested specifications
The estimation results for the unrestricted model are presented in full in Annex 1. The three markets display some differences in the degree of time variation of volatility (see equation ( for divergences in the overnight rates are individually insignificant, although as a group they are jointly significant. So it is possible to impose parameter restrictions. Consequently we estimate the nested GARCH and LEVELS models outlined in equations (4) and (5). (13) For the overnight rate in both Italy and the United Kingdom we are unable to reject either the GARCH model or the LEVELS model. However goodness-of-fit tests suggest the GARCH model better described the UK data, while the LEVELS model is our preferred model for Italy (see Table C ). In Germany, for overnight rates we can reject the restrictions implied by the LEVELS model. Consequently we choose the GARCH model as our preferred specification for German overnight rates. But once we strip out end-of-month maintenance-period effects (shown in Column 3 of Table C) the fit is reduced. Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
Long-run mean of the divergence
Using the coefficient estimates from our preferred specifications in Table C , we estimate the long-run mean of the divergence between short-term money market rates and the policy rate (-β α / ) for each country. In Germany, all three short-term market rates diverged from the policy rate in the long run by a positive and significant amount. However, the magnitude of the mean divergence was small (ie 6-8 basis points). In the United Kingdom, the long-run divergence in both the overnight and one-week interest rates were also significantly different from zero. (14) The estimated long-run means were -11 basis points in both cases, ie market rates tended to be slightly lower than the policy rate. However, the one-month market rate is not significantly different from the policy rate. This contrasts with the results for Italy, where we find no significant difference for either the overnight or the one-week rates, but a significantly negative (-11 basis points) long-run mean for one-month rates. Taken together, the results provide no evidence _____________________________________________________________ (14) All levels of significance are measured at 95% significance level.
to support the claim that control over short-term market rates in Germany or Italy was greater than in the United Kingdom.
The speed of mean reversion
In all three countries, the value of the coefficient ) ( β − was significantly different from zero for the overnight rate. These results supported the view that overnight interest rate shocks were persistent. For example, approximately 53% of a shock to the UK overnight rate, on average, remained the next day and nearly 8% remained a week later. Our estimates of -$ for Italy and the United Kingdom (0.45 and 0.47 respectively) did not differ in a statistically significant way: we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the degree of persistence in shocks to overnight market rates was the same in both countries.
The evidence for Germany suggested that the speed of reversion in overnight rates differed from those found for Italy and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately a case can be made for this difference being in either direction! Using the whole dataset, we calculated a speed of mean reversion of 0.58. However, this reflected the pronounced end-of-month spiking of interest rates in Germany associated with the end of the monthly maintenance period. Re-estimating our model using the 'filtered' series that excluded the end-months from the sample, we found that the speed of mean reversion was only 0.28, significantly less statistically than in the other two countries. Hence the persistence of shocks, unassociated with the end of the maintenance period, was higher in Germany than in Italy or the United Kingdom.
In all three countries the speed of mean reversion falls for the longer maturities; ie shocks were more persistent. The fall was greatest in the United Kingdom, with the speed of reversion falling to 0.17 for one-week rates, and 0.1 for one-month rates. This latter estimate was significantly lower than the corresponding figure for Italy (0.2). It was also lower than the German estimate (0.14), but not sufficiently for us to reject the null hypothesis that the persistence in shocks to German one-month rates was the same as the persistence in UK rates.
Volatility across countries
The estimated coefficients for the GARCH model can be used to compare the unconditional volatility across the three countries for the three maturities we consider, which we present in Table D . The qualitative result that German and UK one-month rates were less volatile than Italian one-month rates remained true when comparing unconditional, rather than conditional, standard deviations. Comparing unconditional volatility across all three countries for overnight and one-week rates was complicated by the results for the UK overnight and Italian one-week rates. These results suggested the presence of either outliers or misspecification of the process (for a fuller discussion, see Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) ). We discuss the possibility of a misspecification of the process for UK overnight rates in Section 5.5 when we consider the possibility of structural breaks.
We cannot estimate an unconditional volatility for Italian one-week rates since the series is explosive ( 1 1 > + b α ): we suspect outliers. Consequently we re-ran the GARCH model for the divergence in the Italian one-week rate, excluding four observations that we classify as outliers. (15) The results are presented in Table A2 .3 of Annex 2. The omission of the outliers reduced the persistence in volatility to 0.59, allowing us to calculate an unconditional standard deviation of just over twelve basis points, in between the values calculated for German and UK one-month rates.
Changes in volatility over time: testing for structural breaks in the United Kingdom
The sample period included two major changes to the structure of the money market in the United Kingdom. Did these changes have any effect _____________________________________________________________ (15) These four consecutive outliers run from 10-13 August 1993. on the unconditional volatility of short-term market rates around the policy rate? If so, which had the largest effect? First, we allow for a structural break in January 1996 following the introduction of the gilt repo market in the United Kingdom (see Section 3 for a fuller discussion). We estimate the unrestricted and GARCH models for the two sample periods either side of that date. This removes the persistence in the variance of the divergence of the overnight rate previously discussed: for both sub-samples we obtain unconditional standard deviations. Table E presents these standard deviations, along with those for the one-week and one-month rates. (16) Our major finding was that the introduction of the repo market led to a sharp reduction in the degree of unconditional volatility, particularly for divergences in the overnight rate. After 1996 unconditional volatility was lower in the United Kingdom than for either Italy or Germany over the same period. The second structural break we consider relates to the changes to the Bank's official operating system introduced in March 1997 (see Section 3). We estimate the unrestricted model for sub-samples covering the periods approximately one year before and after the changes. The results are shown in Annexes 6 and 7. As Table F shows, the structural break had no significant effect on the unconditional variation of the one-week or one-month rates. 
Conclusion
A number of empirical studies have estimated the time series properties of short-term market rates. But few have examined divergences in short-term market rates from the policy rates that central banks use to provide marginal liquidity to the banking system. In the light of this, this paper makes use of a simple reduced-form model to answer some empirical questions about the time series behaviour of divergences of short-term market rates from policy rates in three European countries with different central bank operating systems, prior to the introduction of the euro.
First, we considered to what extent there were differences in the long-run divergence between market rates and policy rates. Taken together, our results provide no evidence to support the view that the degree of control over short-term market rates was lower in the United Kingdom than in either Italy or Germany.
Second, we considered whether there were differences in the speed with which rates reverted back to policy rates following a shock to the money market. Using the entire dataset, our results suggested that short-term rates in Germany reverted significantly faster than in either Italy or the United Kingdom. But after allowing for interest rate spikes associated with the end of the monthly maintenance period, shocks to German rates reverted more slowly than in the other two countries.
Third, we found some evidence to support the view that the volatility of overnight rates was higher in the United Kingdom than in Italy or Germany. But at slightly longer maturities, volatility was little different from that in Germany and was lower than in Italy. And we found that after the introduction of the gilt repo market in 1996, volatility was lower in the United Kingdom than in either of the other countries for all the maturities considered.
Fourth, our tests for structural breaks in the United Kingdom suggested that the introduction of the gilt repo market had a substantially larger effect on reducing volatility than did the introduction of gilt repo as the main daily instrument for providing marginal liquidity to the banking system. Coefficients are estimated from the following model:
(1) (1) (1)
Annex 2: GMM estimates of the GARCH model for the policy-adjusted short rate (1993-98) Coefficients are estimated from the following model:
(1) Coefficients are estimated from the following model:
(1)
Annex 3: GMM estimates of the levels model for the policy-adjusted short rate (1993-98) (1) Coefficients are estimated from the following model:
Annex 4: GMM estimates of the UK policy-adjusted short rate (1993-95) Coefficients are estimated from the following model:
Annex 5: GMM estimates of the UK policy-adjusted short rate (1996-98) (1) Coefficients are estimated from the following model:
Annex 6: GMM estimates of the UK policy-adjusted short rate (26 February 1996 -28 February 1997) Coefficients are estimated from the following model:
(1) 
